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Adorno’s departure from praxis and his focus on theory seemed to be an unnatu-
ral move for a critical theorist. Among students and colleagues this was perceived 
as a serious aberration from Horkheimer’s program. In this paper, two arguments 
in Adorno’s favor are proposed: firstly, that, rather than separating the theory–
praxis couplet, Adorno undertook necessary revisions which made theory more 
accurate in relation to a world that had undergone profound social, political and 
economic changes. The “old” theory was anachronistic, subjectless and left com-
pletely to the benevolence of blind actionism which represented a new form of 
(pseudo–) praxis. The author will attempt to demonstrate that Adorno held a 
firm position on the unity of theory and praxis. The second argument has to do 
with contemporary praxis. Revisiting Adorno’s thoughts on theory and praxis can 
teach us two valuable lessons, namely: 1) that theory can reflect on itself, while 
praxis lacks this capability, and 2) that tactics applied in other societies cannot 
be imported blindly and unmediatedly because they are context–dependent. Both 
lessons are extremely valuable for contemporary social movements and especially 
for those inspired by Marcuse’s version of activist critical theory. Adorno reminds 
us that resistance can easily slip into repression and that, before it can be changed 
through praxis, the world must first be (re)interpreted.
Key words: Theodor Adorno; praxis; actionism; critical theory; resistance; so-
cial movements
Introduction
The legacy of Theodor Adorno still has not waned, at least not in Europe.1 To 
some extent this is unfair to another important figure ‒ Herbert Marcuse. While, 
*  Maroje Višić, Ph.D., Libertas International University, Sv. Dominka 4, 20000 Dubrovnik, Croa-
tia. ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000–0002–0012–528X. E–mail: maroje.visic@gmail.com
1 A special journal called Adorno Studies is dedicated to Adorno’s philosophy. In the 1950’s Ador-
no and Horkheimer returned to West Germany while Marcuse remained in exile for the rest of 
his life. This fact should not be overlooked when assessing the relevance which Adorno’s philo-
sophy has in Europe in comparison to Marcuse.
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in Germany, Adorno’s philosophy is still the subject of numerous books, there 
are no new editions on Marcuse (Zill, 2003). However, in recent years we have 
witnessed a renaissance of interest in Marcuse’s interdisciplinary critical theory. 
Contemporary struggles and movements point to the undiminished potential of 
Marcuse’s critical theory to provide guidance for praxis. However, it is because 
of this “guidance of praxis” that it is necessary to return to Adorno and revisit 
the question on the relation of theory to praxis. The rediscovery of Marcuse’s 
ideas inspires present–day activists and movements. However, the line between 
praxis and pseudo–praxis is perhaps more blurred today than back in the 1960’s. 
Adorno undertook serious revisions on the relation of theory to praxis. These 
revisions ought to be revisited again (and remembered) as they are both a nece-
ssary complement to Marcuse’s activist version of critical theory and can help in 
differentiating between praxis and pseudo–praxis, a distinction which is crucial 
for any social movement.
The entire discussion on the alleged separation of theory and praxis started 
with the protests of 1968 and reached its peak on January 31, 1969 when Adorno 
called the police who arrested students in their attempt to occupy the Institute 
for Social Research. Marcuse, who was very supportive of the student move-
ments in the U.S., could not comprehend Adorno’s move and saw it as siding 
with the apparatus. However, the insurmountable barrier which stood between 
them was the Atlantic Ocean. On one side of the ocean was a liberal democracy 
with movements protesting against the Cold War, the Vietnam War, etc., while 
on the other there were Germany and Europe recuperating from the experiences 
and horrors of fascism. This fact determined the crucial contextual difference 
between protest movements in Germany and in the U.S. Adorno was aware that 
every movement could produce its very opposite. He feared that, regardless of 
how progressive a movement may seem, there was still a chance that it will relap-
se into various authoritarian forms. What was less known was the fact that, aside 
from the leftists, there were other students who also were critical of the U.S., 
namely, the Christian Democratic Students who held different political opinions. 
Christian Democratic Activists of the Association of Christian Democratic Stu-
dents (RCDS) rose in opposition to the Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund 
(SDS): »Instead of expressing gratitude to their American protectors, radical 
students now routinely criticized and defied the United States, whose forces still 
occupied the city […] Christian Democratic students […] had a drastically diffe-
rent sense of what political commitment ought to entail in a city encircled by a 
socialist dictatorship« (Goltz, 2017, 91). Adorno was not alone in thinking that 
the leftist student movement can reignite fascist potential in Germany. RCDS 
shared the opinion that SDS fails to notice totalitarian similarities between fas-
cism and communism: »Instead of recognizing the parallels between Nazism and 
Communism, which were so clearly apparent to him [Wohlrabe], they were focu-
sed on political repression in far–flung places and no longer cared about the fate 
of Germans to the east of the Iron Curtain« (Goltz, 2017, 96). In sum, these were 
the new historical circumstances which pushed for revision of the theory–praxis 
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relationship. Adorno’s “new approach” was partly influenced by events in Ger-
many.
1. Adorno’s position on the relation of theory to praxis
Critical theory is the central theoretical platform developed by Horkheimer, 
Adorno and Marcuse. The main tenet of such a platform is the insistence on the 
unity of theory and praxis. The relation of this unity is marked by tension which 
necessitates sublation, and thus, praxis becomes revolutionary, and the theory 
that guides praxis is in itself a form of revolutionary activity. The conspicuous 
difference inherent in critical theory is its subversiveness towards the reality prin-
ciple. This is what puts critical theory at odds with the traditional form of theo-
rizing (Horkheimer, 2002). Hence, critical theory does not seek to interpret the 
world, it seeks to change it. This revolutionary program inherent in critical theory 
was something that attracted various individuals and groups who sought not only 
a theoretical guideline, but also a practical means of “combating” the injustices 
that late capitalism structurally produces. This implies, as Macdonald (2017, 8) 
argues, a critical empiricism and a commitment to radical transformation. Criti-
cal theory — and here it differs from traditional theory — does not differentiate 
between subject and object. 
Among above–mentioned thinkers, it is Herbert Marcuse who stands out as 
the representative embodiment of scholar activism. From his early writings thro-
ugh to his later works, Marcuse remained dedicated to revolutionary praxis in 
a way that followed an “original” and “unrevised version” of critical theory. In 
One–Dimensional Man Marcuse (1964) faced the same problems of blocked re-
volutionary praxis as Adorno did later. Marcuse (1964) observed that the stabili-
zation of capitalism and the bureaucratization of the Soviet version of socialism, 
the integration of the proletariat, the rise of consumer society and the mass me-
dia, contributed to a decline in revolutionary potential. Marcuse (1964) portrays 
a society in which the revolutionary class is comfortably absorbed into an affluent 
society, and thus no more classes or groups remain who would be willing to fight 
for radical social change. However, Marcuse does not end in a pessimistic tone. 
He relentlessly continues his lifetime quest for a revolutionary subject: »under-
neath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsi-
ders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unem-
ployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their 
life is in most immediate and most real need for ending intolerable conditions 
and institutions. Thus, their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciou-
sness is not« (Marcuse, 1964, 260). This was perhaps Marcuse’s biggest delusion 
which continued to fuel his hopes for a revolution. A few years later, the protests 
of 1968 set Marcuse’s hopes high again. In a letter to Adorno, dated April 5, 
1969, Marcuse recognized »that the situation is not a revolutionary one, not even 
a pre–revolutionary one« (Adorno and Marcuse, 1999, 125). This fact, however, 
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did not compel Marcuse to make significant changes in his theory. He continued 
to pursue an “unrevised” theory which in time became wishful thinking.
Revisions, or so they were perceived, were undertaken by Adorno (and co–
signed by Horkheimer). It should not come as a surprise that Marcuse’s activist 
version of critical theory attracted social movements more than what seemed to 
be Adorno’s rather conservative turnabout. Public perception of the time was 
best captured in the newspaper article proclaiming Marcuse as the only remai-
ning member of the Frankfurt School supporting those who seek to realize the 
goals of critical theory (Kraushaar, 1998, 432). Adorno’s critics and students 
were certain that he deviated from his writings by being conformist in praxis 
(Leslie, 1999, 119).
However, this would be a crude oversimplification. Adorno admitted in a 
radio broadcast that he and Horkheimer were accused of resignation, but only 
largely because they refused to draw practical consequences from theory and to 
provide theoretical support for blind actionism (Adorno, 1998, 289–290). Bell 
(2014) emphasizes that Adorno’s alleged resignation should be understood in 
the historical context within which Adorno directly responded to the Frankfurt 
School’s critics of the radical left and defended his refusal to translate critical 
theory into a program for political action. Against the charge of apolitical ‘resi-
gnation,’ Adorno articulates a defiant vision of critical thought that remains vital 
today, despite the dated trappings of the theory–praxis debate.
Adorno’s position on the relation of theory to praxis underwent significant re-
visions that were, at the time, difficult to grasp for those who firmly believed that 
the world can be changed by guerrilla tactics (or through extra–parliamentary 
means) rather than through the democratic process (e.g. SDS). Krahl (wrongly) 
critiqued Adorno’s thought for not being able to define itself in organizational 
categories. This is why practical transformation of social reality loses its binding 
force (Krahl, 1975, 832). For Marcuse and the SDS, Adorno’s position on theory 
and praxis was untenable. While they insisted on a fusion between theory and 
praxis, Adorno wholeheartedly advocated the autonomy of theory and postpo-
nement of praxis. Hence, he became the target of the radical–wing sociology 
students’ attacks. Students distributed leaflets which read »Adorno as institution 
is dead« and »Whoever gives dear Adorno control will preserve capitalism for 
the rest of his life« (Kraushaar 1998, 418–432).
However, those revisions were much needed for several reasons. Firstly, the-
ory had been lagging behind praxis, or better said, it had fallen into pseudo–
praxis. Secondly, it seemed that theory should be advanced by (pseudo–)praxis2 
2 A position firmly (and unjustifiably) held and advocated by Marcuse who argued that there are 
moments when praxis should push theory forward (Adorno and Marcuse, 1999, 125). In the 
lecture Transition to Moral Philosophy delivered January 26th 1965, Adorno questions the va-
lidity of the doctrine of the historical necessary conditions. Adorno argues: »But I should like 
[…] to plant a few doubts in your minds about the truth of it, particularly when we learn, if we 
study Marx or Hegel, that the Spartacus uprising in ancient Rome or the peasant movement in 
Germany […] or Babeuf’s conspiracy under the Directory in France — that none of that would 
have worked because the historical conditions were not ripe. Whether historical conditions are 
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and could even result in the crushing of theory. Thirdly and most importantly is 
the fact that, in changed historical circumstances, critical theory proved inaccu-
rate and could not grasp social reality. Hence, Adorno rightly considered that the 
new historical situation should first be interpreted. Revisiting Adorno’s thoughts 
on theory and (pseudo–)praxis seems relevant for contemporaneity. It is the opi-
nion of the author that contemporary social movements can easily be led astray 
by blind actionism and can fall into the pseudo–reality of the very same reality 
principle that they aim to negate. Hence, Adorno’s thoughts on theory and praxis 
should serve as a reminder to reflect before acting.
2. The theory–paxis problem
2.1. The new historical situation
Let us begin by quoting Adorno’s famous line: »Philosophy, which once see-
med obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed. The summary 
judgment that it had merely interpreted the world, that resignation in the face of 
reality had crippled it in itself, becomes the defeatism of reason after the attempt 
to change the world miscarried […] Having broken its pledge to be as one with 
reality or at the point of realization, philosophy is obliged ruthlessly to criticize 
itself« (Adorno, 1973, 3). The sentence not only laments the proletariat’s failure 
to seize the moment, but it also offers a glimpse into the theory–praxis problem. 
The fulfillment of the historical task of the proletariat, which theory had expec-
ted and hoped for, would at the same time be the end of pre–history (Marx) and 
theory. However, the moment was irreversibly lost and the “old” theory (resting 
on Marx’s assumptions) continued to live in new historical circumstances. The 
“old” theory was anachronistic to new praxis and needed to be either completely 
built from scratch or revised in such way that it can accurately grasp the new 
historical moment. Hence, Adorno’s turn to theory should be understood accor-
dingly. Adorno’s main argument is that praxis3 is postponed for the time being. 
The new historical situation poses a foundational challenge to critical theory, the 
program of which was based on revolutionary praxis.4 Hence, altered historical 
ever ripe enough to let something happen is always judged after the fact […] And it is very hard 
to say whether, given the extremely complex and often irrational structure of history, things might 
not have turned out differently for once […] I should like at least to add a question mark to 
the tradition from which I have come […] I should only wish to issue a general warning against 
automatically putting yourselves on the side of the victors, and joining in when people say what 
people always say when liberation movements are defeated, namely, that it happened because 
the conditions were not right. Hegel did indeed excoriate appeals to abstract possibility, as did 
Marx« (Adorno, 2001a, 181).
3 In Adorno’s writings the term praxis has multiple and interrelated meanings. Freyenhagen (2014, 
6) enumerates six principal meanings of which no. 3, 4 and 5 are relevant for this discussion: (1) 
as activity (Tätigkeit); (2) as productive labor; (3) as revolutionary activity; (4) as resistance and 
not joining in (Widerstand und Nicht–Mitmachen); (5) as Aktionismus and (6) as activity in a 
liberated society.
4 This required some serious revisions. Hegel’s and Marx’s theoretical inadequacies became part 
of historical practice and can thus be newly reflected upon in theory. Thus, praxis itself was a 
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circumstances call for revisiting the question: »What is critical theory?« It is in 
the interest of praxis that theory should have precedence: »The liquidation of 
theory by dogmatization and thought taboos contributed to bad practice. The 
recovery of theory’s independence lies in the interest of practice itself […] with 
theory paralyzed and disparaged by the all–governing bustle, its mere existence, 
however impotent, bears witness against the bustle. This is why theory is legitimate 
and why it is hated; without it, there would be no changing the practice that con-
stantly calls for change. Those who chide theory anachronistically obey the topos of 
dismissing […] and the target is theoretically missed« (Adorno, 1973, 143).
Adorno (1989) finds the main culprit for the discrepancy of theory and praxis to 
be the wrongfulness of Marx’s immiseration thesis.5 The integration of the proleta-
riat signaled the disappearance of the revolutionary agent.6 Practical misgivings of 
the existing versions of socialism in China and the USSR made the socialist alter-
native undesirable and presented an obstacle to liberation.7 In sum, these were the 
conditions which, in Adorno’s view, justified the primacy of theory.
2.2. The shift from revolutionary to transformative praxis
The social and material conditions of late modernity compel Adorno to make 
the shift from revolutionary to transformative praxis. Transformative praxis is 
expressed through the idea of right living and the ethics of resistance.8 Adorno 
theoretical concept (Adorno, 1973, 144).
5 Marx’s emiseration thesis is the result of an analysis of the economic development of capitali-
sm. In The General Law of Capitalistic Accumulation Marx (1995, 480) argues that further deve-
lopment of capitalism would emiserate laborers; that they would be replaced by the machines. 
Due to this technological development, the production would increase but there wouldn’t be a 
rise in the salaries since the input of human labor remains the same.
6 Adorno (2002a) uses the term culture industry (that functions as an integrative force) to explain 
the integration of the proletariat.
7 For a detailed account and critique see Marcuse’s Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis. Here Mar-
cuse demonstrates two things: 1) serious deviations from Marx’s theory that have happened in 
Soviet society, and 2) shared similarities between Soviet and capitalist societies. Technological 
development of Western societies, argues Marcuse (1958), enables parallel sustention of the 
military industry and raising living standard. This means that Soviet society actually supports the 
stability and unity of capitalistic society. In order to justify the official ideology, Soviet Marxism 
must, according to Marcuse (1958), petrify and stop the dialectical process, which is comple-
tely contrary to the internal structure of the dialectic. Marcuse (1958) also warns that the thesis 
of the mutual conflict between capitalist countries and the internal crisis of the system cannot 
serve as a major orientation for Soviet Marxism. Finally, the same factors which hindered the 
development of individuality and autonomy in Western society were at work in Soviet society: 
»the same mechanization and rationalization generated attitudes of standardized conformity and 
precise submission to the machine which required adjustment and reaction rather than autonomy 
and spontaneity. If nationalization and centralization of the industrial apparatus goes hand in 
hand with […] the subjugation and enforcement of labor as a fulltime occupation, progress in in-
dustrialization is tantamount to progress in domination: attendance to the machine, the scientific 
work process, becomes totalitarian, affecting all spheres of life« (Marcuse, 1958, 84). Although 
Marcuse’s prediction of the possibility of liberation in the USSR moving from superstructure to 
base ultimately proved to be wrong, the analysis and critique of Soviet society is relevant as an 
eastern counterpart of One–Dimensional Man.
8 Refugee for the homeless: »Wrong life cannot be lived rightly« (Adorno, 2005, 38).
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proposes taking a defensive stance of resistance against the bad forms of life that 
late modernity structurally produces.9 This is what ignited students and critics 
who thought that Adorno went astray from the unity of theory and praxis. Alt-
hough it may seem that Adorno abandons revolutionary ethics, the idea of right 
living has radical transformative potential that can be put in praxis, however, 
not through extra–parliamentary means10 but through the democratic process 
instead: »We might even say that the quest for the good life is the quest for the 
right form of politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lies within the realm 
of what can be achieved today« (Adorno, 2001b, 176). Adorno is aware that only 
a fine line separates resistance and repression and that the former can easily 
slip into the latter. (Passive) resistance is not completely harmless and it can be 
turned easily into its opposite despite the noble cause of those involved. Adorno 
(1998, 290) detects that the unity of theory and praxis has this tendency of slip-
ping into the predominance of (oppressive) praxis. Thus, he warns that, even if 
resistance does not involve repression, it can still provoke it.11 He further clarifi-
es this point in a letter to Marcuse: »I would have to deny everything that I think 
and know about the objective tendency if I wanted to believe that the student 
protest movement in Germany had even the tiniest prospect of effecting a social 
intervention. Because […] it cannot do that, its effect is questionable in two res-
pects: firstly, inasmuch as it inflames undiminished fascist potential in Germany, 
without even caring about it and secondly, insofar as it breeds in itself tendencies 
which […] directly converge with fascism« (Adorno and Marcuse, 1999, 131).
One can conclude that, by advocating withdrawal from public life, Adorno is 
proposing subjective inwardness. However, this would be far–fetched. Subjective 
inwardness and closing oneself off from the public sphere makes one complicit 
in pseudo–praxis. Thus, Adorno stresses the relevance of the material world and, 
in doing so, brings to the fore his true dedication to the basic tenets of critical 
theory — the insistence on transforming the relations of production: »Whatever 
an individual or a group may undertake against the totality they are part of is 
infected by the evil of that totality; and no less infected is he who does nothing 
at all […] The individual who dreams of moral certainty is bound to fail, bound 
to incur guilt because, being harnessed to the social order, he has virtually no 
power over the conditions whose cry for change appeals to the moral ingenium 
[…] Without recourse to the material, no ought could issue from reason; yet 
once compelled to acknowledge its material in the abstract, as a condition of its 
own possibility, reason must not cut off its reflection on the specific material« 
(Adorno, 1973, 243).
Critical theory suffers from the same ailment as (pseudo–) praxis. This “ill-
ness” revealed the structural problems of critical theory. Its theoretical assump-
9 Adorno (1998, 203) also refers to the experiences of fascism and argues that political instruction 
should be centered upon the idea that Auschwitz should never happen again.
10 Something that Marcuse hoped for. Marcuse (1969, 68) argues that extra–parliamentary opposi-
tion can expose the destructive character of civil obedience to a reactionary regime.
11 E.g. the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg. The police officer who shot him was acquitted of charges!
Maroje Višić, Revisiting Adorno's Position on the... Obnovljeni Život, 2020, 75(3), 311–322
318
tions are being questioned, and the whole project could collapse under its own 
weight. Adorno (1973, 245) is perfectly aware of this and argues that problems of 
practice ail even theory. The only recourse to avoiding unnecessary violence is to 
re–think both theory and praxis. Thus, Adorno responded by giving precedence 
to theory over praxis.12 This move is often interpreted as his resignation and 
separation of the theory and praxis couplet, which was an emblematic feature of 
critical theory: »The Archimedian point ‒ how might non–repressive praxis be 
possible, how might one steer between the alternatives of spontaneity and orga-
nization ‒ this point, if it exists at all, cannot be found other than through theory« 
(Adorno, 1998, 274). Adorno was adamant that theory should not guide praxis, 
and on several occasions he (justifiably) rejected the idea.13 In The New Manife-
sto Adorno and Horkheimer (2010, 46) clearly stated that they are not proposing 
any mode of action. In the interview to Der Spiegel Adorno repeated that his 
writings could not be a platform for action and rather that his reflections stand 
in an indirect relationship to praxis: »Today’s unfortunate relationship between 
theory and praxis consists precisely in the fact that theory is subjected to a practi-
cal pre–censorship […] I still believe that one should hold on to theory, precisely 
under the general coercion toward praxis in a functional and pragmatized world« 
(Adorno, 2002b, 15–16).
2.3. The unique ability of theory to reflect upon itself
The crucial reason for giving precedence to theory over praxis is the unique 
ability of the former to reflect upon itself. While praxis may be an unreflective ac-
tionism that »devours its children«, theory possesses the unique feature of self–
reflection. In the case of blocked revolutionary praxis the precedence of theory 
is justified because, »if I have the concept of reflection, the concept of practice 
implicitly postulates that of theory […] What makes theory more than a mere 
instrument of practice is the fact that it reflects on itself and, in so doing, rescinds 
itself as mere theory. It can achieve this only by targeting true practice« (Ador-
no and Horkheimer, 2010, 57–58). This move distances theory from violence.14 
Adorno argued that people should be discouraged from acting outwardly prior 
to reflecting on themselves. Hence, the only possible education was education 
directed toward critical self–reflection (Adorno, 1998, 193). Hence, in this view 
a theorist’s engagement in the critical examination of facts is part and parcel 
of resistance: »By contrast the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither 
signs over his consciousness nor lets himself be terrorized into action, is in truth 
the one who does not give in« (Adorno, 1998, 292). In the resistance movement 
12 Adorno (2000) argues that this is the case with Marx. Theses on Feuerbach cannot be understood 
if abstracted from the historical dimension. They are meaningful only in the case of anticipating 
a revolution. Marx isolated himself to recalibrate his theory once the revolution failed.
13 This is what puts Adorno at odds with Marcuse. Marcuse firmly argued that theory can be further 
developed by praxis. Adorno replied that they need to discuss this more thoroughly (Adorno and 
Marcuse, 125–127).
14 Exception is violence aimed at combating fascist regimes.
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the theorist plays the role of public intellectual who uses mass media to reach 
audiences.15 The theorist acts in an educational and pedagogical way rather than 
as a revolutionary.16 Adorno (1998) advocated critical education through grea-
ter emphasis on studies in sociology and pedagogy. He considered that the enli-
ghtenment process of educating the educators could result in forming new cadres 
whose influence in the most diverse contexts would then finally reach the whole 
of society. This puts Adorno at odds with Marcuse who would rather be among 
students than on television and/or radio.
The task of revised critical theory is to create a new subjectivity. This can be 
done by liberating subjects from immersion into pseudo–praxis17 and by enabling 
a change in the consciousness: »Pseudo–reality is conjoined with, as its subjec-
tive attitude, pseudo–activity: action that overdoes and aggravates itself for the 
sake of its own publicity, without admitting to itself to what extent it serves as a 
substitute satisfaction, elevating itself into an end in itself. People locked in des-
perately want to get out. In such situations one does not think anymore, or does 
so only under fictive premises. Within absolutized praxis only reaction is possible 
and therefore is false. Only thinking could find an exit […] The situation can be 
changed, if at all, by undiminished insight. The leap into praxis does not cure 
thought of resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret knowledge that that 
really is not the right way to go« (Adorno, 1998, 291).
Although Adorno “separated” the theory and praxis couplet by “resigning” 
with respect to the latter, he firmly holds that these are not on opposite poles, but 
rather both are a form of activity: »A consciousness of theory and praxis must be 
produced that neither divides the two such that theory becomes powerless and 
praxis becomes arbitrary […] Thinking is a doing, theory a form of praxis […] 
Thinking has a double character: it is immanently determined and rigorous, and 
yet an inalienably real mode of behavior in the midst of reality« (Adorno, 1998, 
261). Adorno and Marcuse disputed over the relation of theory to praxis and stu-
dents of Adorno critiqued him for betraying his own theory. However, critique is 
not completely founded. Adorno should not be seen as a “loose mandarin” going 
astray from the fundamental postulates of critical theory. Rather, he remained 
committed to the unity of theory and praxis (but rejected to equate praxis with 
pseudo–praxis). And thus, for the transition from pseudo–reality to reality to 
occur, one has first to (re)analyze and (re)interpret social order. Acting on the 
result of this analysis is what constitutes true and authentic praxis. Adorno stron-
15 Adorno’s resistance in Germany included frequent TV and radio appearances as well as exami-
ning future teachers and educators.
16 For Marcuse (2005) the true nature of the philosopher is exemplified in Kierkegaards’ move 
towards publicness. Macdonald (2018, 534–535) criticizes Adorno on this basis, arguing that 
Adorno was comfortable delivering critique in the classroom while he was appalled with the idea 
of standing at the barricades.
17 Namely from the collectivization in consumerist society. Adorno (1998, 165) noted that persona-
lity cannot be saved. But what should be preserved from this concept is the strength of the indivi-
dual resisting to be swept into uniformity Thus, it is only if the individual manages to incorporate 
objectivity within himself that he can develop resistance to it.
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gly opposes blind and unenlightened actionism:18 »The neediness of the object is 
mediated via the total societal system; for that reason it can be determined criti-
cally only by theory. Praxis without theory, lagging behind the most advanced sta-
te of cognition, cannot but fail, and praxis, in keeping with its own concept, would 
like to succeed. False praxis is no praxis. Desperation which, because it finds the 
exits blocked, blindly leaps into praxis, with the purest of intentions joins forces 
with catastrophe. The hostility to theory in the spirit of the times, the by no me-
ans coincidental withering away of theory, its banishment by an impatience that 
wants to change the world without having to interpret it« (Adorno, 1998, 265).
Conclusion
Rather than abandoning praxis in favor of theory, Adorno attempted to reca-
librate theory and render it more in tune with the new historical world. Only such 
theory can inspire and guide new praxis. Adorno was well aware that, without 
necessary revisions, all that was left of Horkheimer’s program was theory from 
tempi passati. Instead of being at the forefront of praxis, the old theory functions 
as an all–around excuse for various movements caught in the vortex of pseu-
do–praxis. Thus, Adorno not only attempted to revise the basic tenets of critical 
theory but also to liberate individuals from their entrapment into the very reality 
principle they continued to negate. Adorno firmly remained dedicated to the cri-
tical theory program of dialectical sublation of the established reality principle.
Critical theory is not an academic discipline developed solely behind the walls 
of an ivory tower. It is an integral part of activism and a form of praxis. Hence, 
the conclusion that may be drawn should not remain a dead letter. It should, to 
a certain extent, inform contemporary praxis by drawing important lessons from 
Adorno’s views. This is especially true of Marcuse’s renaissance. What comes to 
mind is Marcuse’s notorious essay Repressive Tolerance. Marcuse (1970) labels 
as progressive by default all movements coming from the left and argues that 
movements from the right should not be tolerated. It is an extreme position that 
Adorno fears and of which Adorno actually warns when arguing that movements 
can end up as their very opposite. Adorno and Christian Democratic Students 
were correct in their critique and in pointing out similarities between fascism 
and communism which the leftist students failed to realize. Because of their dis-
respect for democratic structures and intolerance, Habermas labeled German 
student movements as “left–wing fascism”. Not every leftist demand, much less 
movement, is progressive by definition. Marcuse’s concepts and his activist ver-
sion of critical theory may perhaps be useful for some leftist movements and 
social struggles, but on the flip side, some of them could easily end up as “left–
18 One example is when German students attempted to unmediatedly import guerilla tactics into 
Western democracies: »Things might be different with the guerrilla tactics of the Third World; 
nothing in the administered world functions wholly without disruption […] Models that do not 
prove themselves even in the Bolivian bush cannot be exported« (Adorno, 1998, 269–270).
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wing fascism”. Hence, one should keep in mind that before blindly following any 
precepts, one should reflect on the context and not simply import those tactics 
that proved useful elsewhere. Adorno warns that it is easy to fall into the trap of 
pseudo–praxis and thus, instead of enacting the desired change, to contribute 
more to preserving the established reality rather than ending up with some form 
of left–wing totalitarianism.
The legacy of Theodor Adorno can still shape modern theoretical debates.
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Preispitivanje Adornova stava o odnosu teorije i prakse
Maroje Višić*
Sažetak
Adornovo napuštanje prakse i akcentiranje primata teorije činilo se nesvojstvenim 
potezom za kritičkoga teoretičara. Među kolegama i studentima Adornov potez 
shvaćen je ozbiljnim odstupanjem od Horkheimerova programa. U ovom radu iz-
nose se dva argumenta. Najprije se nastoji pokazati kako kod Adorna nije posrijedi 
izričito razdvajanje teorije od prakse, nego je riječ o nužno potrebnoj reviziji koja bi 
trebala iznova aktualizirati teoriju u svijetu koji je prošao kroz duboke društvene, 
političke i ekonomske promjene. “Stara” teorija bila je anakronistička, bez subjek-
ta i potpuno izručena nerefleksivnomu akcionizmu, koji je predstavljao novi oblik 
(pseudo)prakse. Zatim se pokazuje da je Adorno zadržao čvrsto stajalište o jedin-
stvu teorije i prakse. Drugi argument odnosi se na suvremenu praksu. Preispitivanje 
Adornovih misli o teoriji i praksi može podučiti dvama vrijednim lekcijama: 1. teo-
rija može reflektirati na sebe samu, a praksa nema tu mogućnost; 2. taktike iz drugih 
društava ne mogu se slijepo i nerefleksivno uvoziti, jer su one određene društvenim 
kontekstima. Obje lekcije izuzetno su vrijedne za suvremene društvene pokrete, a 
posebno za one koje nadahnjuje Marcuseova varijanta aktivističke kritičke teorije. 
Adorno podsjeća da se otpor može lako pretvoriti u represiju i da svijet, prije nego što 
se može promijeniti praksom, mora biti iznova protumačen.
Ključne riječi: Theodor Adorno; praxis; akcionizam; kritička teorija; otpor; 
društveni pokreti
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